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A R G U M E N T S

Weighing
Poison
Fruit
If the high court approves the latest
round of excuses for Miranda violations,
it will be time to ask whether the
requirement is worth preserving at all.

By Yale Kamisar
THE SIMPLEST CASES I OLVI G THE
exclusion of illegally obtained evid nee, th
items the defense is trying to suppress, uch as
drugs found during the search of a suspect's
pocket, are direct, or primary, in their r lationship to the
police action. Thus, if the police have acted unlawfully,
the evidence must be excluded from trial.
Many times, however, evidence is derivativ , or secondary, in character. For example, an illegal search may turn
up a key to an ai!port locker where the proceeds of a bank
robbery are being kept. Or a coerced confession may reveal the place where a suspect hid a murder w apon. Or an
illegal tap of the defendant's phone may reveal the whereabouts of a person willing to testify against th defendant.
In such cases it is necessary to determine whether the derivative evidence is fatally tainted by the initial or primary
government illegality. To use the phrase coined by U.S.
Supreme Court justice Felix Frankfurter in a 1939 case, in
these instances, the question presented is whether the
challenged evidence is the "fruit of the poisonous tree."
The Court recognized long ago, however, that not all
evidence was the fruit of the poisonous tree simply because it was discovered du to the illegal action of the police. Thus, merely establishing a logical connection between a police violation of the law and the subsequent
acquisition of incriminating evidence does not automatically lead to the exclusion of the evidence. Depending on
the situation, the need to condemn or to deter police
transgressions may reach the point of diminishing rehrrns-i.e., the exclusionary rule may impose greater costs
on the legitimate demands oflaw enforcement than can
be justified by the rule's purpos s.
Al thou h the fruit of the oisonous tree doctrine has

limits, it is important. By prohibiting indirect or derivative use of the results of police misconduct, as well as direct use, the doctrine helps assure that officials who violate the law are not in a better position than those who
ob y it. Absent a fruits doctrine, law enforcement officials
would be greatly tempted to resort to methods inconsistent with, and offensive to, a free society.
There is ample reason , however, to fear (or, depending
upon one's viewpoint, to rejoice) that the fruits doctrine
may not apply at all (or apply only in very special circumstances) to violations of Miranda, the centerpiece of the
Warren Court's revolution in American criminal procedure. The Supreme Court is expected to resolve the
question finally and authoritatively during its 2003-04
term, which begins this month.
The high court will review two cases that have been decided in favor of the defendant. One case grew out of the
prosecution of Samuel Patane for being a convicted felon in
possession of a firearm. Without administe1ing a complete
set of Miranda warnings, a detective questioned Patane
about the location of a Glock pistol Patane was suppos d to
O\.\'ll. The defendant responded that the weapon was on a
shelf in his bedroom. This admission led almost immediately to the seizure of the weapon where the defendant said it
was. The prosecution conceded that Patane's admission in
response to the questioning was inadmissible under Miranda, but argued that the physical fruit of the Miranda violation-th Glock pistol itself-should be admitt d. The U.S.
ourt of Appeals for tl1e Tenth Circuit unanimously dis-
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agr d, concluding that "Miranda's deterrent
purpos would not be vindicated meaningfully
by suppre ion only of Patane's statement."
During its n w term, the Supreme Court
·11 al o con ·id r a Mi souri case-the prosecution of Patricia Seibert for murder. When
eibert was taken to an "interview room"
(which is what the police like to call the room
wher th interrogate people), she was ub. cted to what might be called a twostage interrogation. During the first
stage which lasted at least 30 minute ,
the officer who did the que tioning deliberately failed to give her the Miranda
warnings. ibert made several incriminating statements. After a 20-minute
br ak, th officer resumed the questioning. This tim h did administer the Mi;
randa warnings. Th defendant signed a
vaiver form. During the second tage,
the offic r reminded the defendant of
th statements h had made before th
20-minute br ale. Thus, he was able to
link togeth r the unwarned qu tioning during
the flrst stag with the warn d questioning
during the s cond. As hoped, and expect d,
ibert mad more incriminating stat ments.
In an unu ual display of candor, th int rrogating officer te tined that-as a r ult of
the training h had received at an instituteh had made a consciou decision to withhold
the Miranda warnings during th Srst
ion
in order to get the defendant to male incriminating statements during th lat r
The trial court suppr
d onl th unwarned portion of the interrogation, and eibrt was convicted of second-cl gr murd r. A
4-to-3 majority of the Missouri uprem ourt
reversed, ruling that the stat m nts mad in
th warned portion of th int rrogation should
have been excluded as well. "\ r police abl
to use this 'end run' around Miranda to ecur
the all-important 'br akihrough' admis ion
during the rust stage of th interrogation," oberved the majority, "the r quir m nt of a
warning would be meaning! ss."
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er will b trying hard to minimize-is a
19 5 ca e called Oregon v. Elstad. In that
cas , two polic officers went to the house o
an 1 -year-old susp ct and, without administ ring Miranda warnings, a ked him about
hi invol m nt in a burglary. The defendant
r plied, "Yes, I was ther ." bout an hour latr, after h had b n talcen to the h riff's office, th d ~ ndant was first advi ed of his
Miranda rights. Ile waived his right and
ga the polic a stat ment detailing hi participation in the burglary. The Oregon Court
of ppeals uppressed the statem nt mad at
the sherifrs office as well as the one th cl fi ndant made in his own home.
The Suprern Court reversed. The Or gon
court, point d out justice Sandra Day O'Connor for a 6-to-3 majority, had miscon trued
protections afford d by Miranda by assuming
that "a failure to administer Miranda warnings
nece sarily br eds the same consequence as
police infring ment of a constitutional right,
so that vidence uncovered following an un-
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al d cision? Probably b cause all th qualiflcations and xception to Miranda impo e?
on it before its constitutional status was clanfl d are going to remain in place.
Ther appear to be a strong con en us
among criminal procedur profe ors that th
majority opinion in Dickerson was a compromise opinion designed to obtain the large t
majority po sible on th narrow question

of Miranda's continued vitality. Ther also
seems to be a consensus (one that I share)
that what Dickerson reaffirmed was not the
Miranda doctrine that burst on the scene in
1966, but Miranda with all the exceptions it
has acquired since 1966 frozen in time.
If the consensus about the meaning of
Dickerson is well-founded, it would be unwise
to launch a frontal assault on Elstad. But that
is no reason to extend Elstad beyond its facts.
That case does contain some swe ping language indicating that the Court is stripping, or
prepared to strip, remedies for Miranda violations of the fruits doctrine. But Elstad may
plausibly be read mor narrowly than that.
At one point, th Elstad majority se med
to cast its holding in t rms of a suspect's
freedom to decide his own course of action:
'We hold today that a suspect who has once
responded to unwarn d yet unco rcive questioning is not th r by disabl d from waiving
hi rights and conC ssing aft r h has b en
gi en the requisit Miranda warnings." In
hort, as Suprem ourt justice William Br nnan observed in his dissenting opinion , the
Elstad majority r lied in considerable part on
"indi.vidual 'volition' as an insulating factor in
succ ssive confession cas s"-a factor "altogeth r missing in the cont xt of inanimate evid nee [such as a Glock pistol]."
This att mpt to distinguish Elstad may not
succe d. It certainly has not persuaded the
many lower courts that have allowed the
government to u e physical evidence derived from Miranda violations. (But few
low r courts are enamored of Miranda.)
The Court is more likely to affirm the Missouri case, Seibert, than to agree with the
Tenth Circuit that the Glock pistol should be
excluded. Although Seibert is a successive
confession case like Elstad, it is diffi rent in an
important respect-the gravity of the Miranda violation. (Courts are much more inclined
to apply the fruits docbine when the underlying illegality is purposeful or flagrant.)
The failure to administer the Miranda
warnings to Elstad the first time the police
talk d to him seems to have been inadvertent.
The Miranda violation in Seibert, on the other
hand, was quite d liberate. In fact, the officer
who withheld th Miranda warnings admitted
that he did so purpos ly. Indeed, he testified
that he had b n train d to use these tactics
in ord r to get an admission of guilt.
Talk about fruits and purging the primary
taint is useful, but som times it obfuscates the
r levant question-wh ther admitting secondary evid nc will signiHcantly encourage
polic misconduct in the future. ietzsch
one said that th commonest stupidity consists in forgetting what one is trying to do.
What was the Miranda court trying to do?
Was it to take away tl1e police's inc ntive to
xploit p ople's anxiety, confusion, and _ignorance b im I ·n that the olice had the

right to an answer, and suspects better an
swer, or else matters will become so much th
worse for them? How can we possibly hope t
achieve Miranda's objective when we prohibi
only tl1e incriminating statements obtained ·
violation of that case, but permit the use o
everything these statements propagate?
The Supreme Court ought to affirm botl
Patane and Seibert. But tlie need to exclud
the derivative evidence in Seibert is especiall
compelling. For there, the officer violated Miranda-as he was trained to do---for the ve
purpose of obtaining derivative evidence.
A distinct possibility exists that th Su
pre me Court will disagree with me, and admi
th vidence in both the Missouri and~ ntl
Circuit cases. It should not be ov rlook d tl1a
thr e members of th seven-judge Missou ·
Supreme Court dissented in Seibert, insistin
that, according to Elstad, the traditional frui
doctrine does not apply to unwam d qu s
tioning "so long as the initial unwarned state
ment is not actually coerced." (One ~ dera
court of appeals r c ntly reach cl th sam
conclusion on similar facts.)
If the Court agr s with the Seib rt dis
senters, we can b sure that polic trainin
instructors will call th cl cision to th att n
tion of tl1eir students. Ind ed, as th t stimo
ny of the interrogating officer in Seibert its 1
demonstrates, the police ar alr ady b in
instructed in how to exploit the loophol
provided by current Miranda law.
Missouri pouce are not alone. Fi e year
ago, lawyers seeking to prohibit officers in tw
California police cl partments from question
ing custodial suspects after they asserted the·
rights came upon a police training vid otap
on which a deputy district attorney told Cali
fomia police officers: "Tb Miranda clusion
ary rule is limited to the cl fendant's own state
ment out of his moutl1 . .. . It do sn't have
fruit of the poisonous b.· theory attached t
it . ... [When we qu stion someon who h
invoked his Miranda rights] all we lose is tl1
statement taken in violation of Miranda. W,
do not lose physical evidence tl1at r suite
from that. We do not lose the testimony o
other witnesses that we I amed about only b
violating his Miranda invocation."
Th California d puty clistri t attorne
could tum out to be right. The Suprem ou
could mak it cl ar som tim during its ne
t rm that Miranda violations have no frui
doctrine-even wh n pouc offi.c rs d liber
at ly violate Miranda pursuant to the trainin
that instructors lik th California cl puty dis
trict attorney give th m. If so, w should sim
pl giv Mimnck, a respectful burial.
Yale Kami ar is a professor of law at both th
University of Michigan and Univer: ity o
San Diego Law School . He is author of Po
lie Int rrogation and Confessions. E-mail.
kamisar@umich. du.

